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ABSTRACT
Welfare eligibility is usually determined via income and finan-
cial assets. Since devolution of Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families administration in 1996, there is significant state varia-
tion in these criteria. Previous research suggests that income
limits are influenced by racial politics, with more restrictive
criteria associated with higher Black populations. The current
study examined whether asset testing is similarly determined.
Findings indicate that asset tests are positively associated with
a democratic State Senate, median income, and the percen-
tage of Black residents. The presence of advocates seeking to
advance asset-building opportunities to low-income families
may have influenced this divergence in income and asset
testing.
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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996 devolved determination of maximum participant
assets to states in the newly created Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) program. Today, many asset limits remain at 1980s’
levels whereas others have been significantly increased or eliminated
altogether. Liberalized limits are associated with increased savings and
vehicle ownership among low-income families and decreased administra-
tive costs. According to advocates, this change provides low-income
families with an important opportunity to gain financial independence
(Prosperity Now, 2018). However, no previous research has examined the
factors affecting state-level decision making regarding asset limits. The
eight states to eliminate limits altogether (Alabama, Colorado, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Ohio, and Virginia) appear at first glance
to represent a diversity of political and economic conditions. The study
described here therefore tests the relationship between TANF asset limits
and various state-level demographic, economic, and political factors via
CONTACT Leah Hamilton hamiltonl@appstate.edu
Authors Note
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Society for Social Work and Research conference in
January, 2018.
the creation of panel data set for all 50 states and the District of Columbia
for the years 1999 to 2015.
Literature review
Welfare asset limits were first set at $1,000 by Reagan’s Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981 (McDonald, Orszag, & Russell, 2005). Since passage
of PRWORA in 1996, policy think tanks such as Prosperity Now (2018) and the
Urban Institute have advocated for state liberalization of the asset test remove
barriers to asset building for low-income families. This work is situated within
a broader framework of asset-development efforts to combat poverty and
stagnant economic mobility. Asset-development efforts such as Individual
Development Accounts (IDAs) and Child Savings Accounts have been found
to improve not only family financial stability, but also mental well-being and
future planning (Bent-Goodley et al., 2016). Low asset limits in public assistance
programs, however, mean that families in need of assistance are essentially
blocked from asset-building efforts. Although 30 states now exclude IDAs
from asset testing for TANF and 14 states exclude 529 college savings accounts,
more common assets such as savings accounts and vehicles continue to face
scrutiny (Prosperity Now, 2018).
Today, asset limits vary significantly and range from $1,000 to $10,000;
however, the threshold for the majority of states is at or below $2,500 (Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2016). Overall, 37 states impose asset limits at or below
$3,000 (Gehr, 2016). The $1,000 limit remains in effect for several states:
Georgia, Indiana, Washington, New Hampshire, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas (Gehr, 2016). Some of the states
with $1,000 limits for applicants increase the limit for recipients, which
should theoretically allow for asset building once enrolled in the program
(Gehr, 2016). For example, the applicant limit for Missouri is $1,000, whereas
recipients can accumulate assets up to $5,000 without sanction (Gehr, 2016).
New Hampshire and Indiana also allow recipients to have more assets than
applicants, but the amounts are somewhat negligible. For instance, Indiana
recipients can increase assets to $1,500 and New Hampshire recipients can
increase assets to $2,000 (Gehr, 2016). Oregon increases the asset limits for
recipients to $10,000 from $2,500 for applicants (Gehr, 2016). Conversely,
Minnesota (passed in 2016) and Delaware have the most liberalized asset
limits:$10,000 for applicants and recipients (Gehr, 2016).
The elimination or liberalization of TANF asset limits increases administra-
tive savings in multiple states and contexts. After Virginia eliminated asset
limits, the state saved an estimated $300,000 in administrative costs annually
because caseworkers were no longer verifying assets (Corporation for Enterprise
Development, 2013). Overall, states that eliminate or raise asset limits to at least
$3,000 report an estimated 2% administrative savings per year (Pew Charitable
Trusts, 2016). Between 2013 and 2014, California spent nearly $6.4 million on
the asset-testing process, only to discover minimal violations (Brown-Robertson
& Otabor, 2015). Only 2% of applicants were found to be ineligible for the
program due to cash assets during that time (Brown-Robertson &Otabor, 2015).
Aside from explicitly monetary savings, an argument can be made for a savings
of resources and time. For example, removal of asset testing can lead to faster
service delivery due to a decrease in time related to filling out the application and
verifying assets (Gehr, 2016).
Despite administrative savings successes, other concerns may cloud the
perception of asset-limit elimination. Changes to a state caseload, for example,
is commonly employed to measure the success or failure of welfare reform
(Schram & Soss, 2001). Thus, an increase in caseload size is a common concern
regarding the elimination or liberalization of resource limits. Despite this worry,
Virginia and Ohio did not experience caseload increases after TANF asset limits
were eliminated (Rand, 2007). An additional analysis indicates no caseload
increases for five states that eliminated or liberalized, even though the analysis
was conducted during the Great Recession and soaring unemployment rates
(Hamilton, Alexander-Eitzman, & Royal, 2015). Between the years of 2000 and
2014, TANF caseloads experienced a general decrease (roughly 38%) as an
overarching trend (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). Only six states experienced
increases in caseloads during this time, and just one of those states had elimi-
nated asset limits (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). Louisiana and Ohio, two states
with eliminated asset tests, experienced decreases greater than or equal to 50%
during this period (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). If caseload size is associated
with the perceived success of TANF or other welfare reforms, the elimination or
liberalization of asset testing should therefore be considered a successful reform
to the existing policy.
Aside from caseload implications, asset-limit elimination may also affect
recipients’ savings behaviors. One study suggests that TANF asset-limit
liberalization is associated with an overall increase in all low-income
families’ savings as opposed to just welfare recipients (Nam, 2008). An
important factor from the study is time: the longer a liberalized asset limit
has been in effect, the more likely a population will save or open bank
accounts (Nam, 2008). Other research yields mixed results regarding
savings behavior. For example, a study of female-headed households
between 1978 and 1983 indicated a $0.25 decrease in savings per $1 asset-
limit decrease (Powers, 1998). Conversely, another study of a similar
population between 1994 and 2001 indicated no association regarding
savings rates and asset limits; however, the findings did suggest that
vehicle restrictions may have an impact on female-headed household car
purchase and ownership (Hurst & Ziliak, 2006). Sullivan (2006) similarly
determined “full vehicle exemption increases average vehicle equity by
about $565” (p. 103).
Vehicle ownership is particularly important when considering employ-
ment opportunities (Bansak, Mattson, & Rice, 2010). For example, having
a vehicle can help employees or future employees attend job interviews, go
to work, and maintain employment without missing days due to a lack of
transportation. Qualitative research also suggests potential links between
getting hired and owning a vehicle (Fletcher, Garasky, Jensen, & Nielsen,
2010). Rural areas can be troublesome in particular. For instance, com-
muting jobs often yield more income; however, reliable transportation is
necessary for such employment opportunities and public transit may not
be an option (Fletcher et al., 2010). Participants in Fletcher et al. (2010)
study were asked about reliable transportation and car ownership during
job interviews. Some of the participants had social support networks
allowing for vehicle exchange but still found the lack of individual vehicle
ownership to be problematic for situations like working third shift
(Fletcher et al., 2010). Another study indicated a relationship between
vehicle ownership and employment in urban areas as well. Overall, having
a vehicle helps facilitate employment in sprawling cities (Ong, 2002).
Ong’s (2002) analysis suggests that vehicle ownership increases the chances
of employment by 9%. Currently, 19 states exempt all household vehicles
from the asset-testing process (Gehr, 2016).
Presently, eight states have eliminated asset limits in general. Ohio was the
first state to eliminate in 1997, followed by Virginia in 2003. Alabama,
Louisiana, Maryland, Hawaii, Illinois, and Colorado all eliminated resource
testing as an eligibility criterion between 2009 and 2014. Colorado initially
liberalized the limit to $15,000 in 2006 before eliminating it completely in
2011 (Corporation for Enterprise Development, n.d.; Hamilton et al., 2015).
All of these states, aside from Virginia, have also eliminated asset testing for
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (Gehr, 2016).
How are TANF asset limits determined?
It is not yet clear how and why states set TANF asset-limits policies. Previous
research has explored the ways in which economics, politics, institutional
structures, and racial disparities affect welfare policy (Amenta, Bonastia, &
Caren, 2001; Piven & Cloward, 1993; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2008). Some
research suggests that the various safety net programs are affected by differ-
ing factors. In other words, the logic behind retrenchment may vary by
program. The Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), for example,
tends to reflect the condition of the state economy. Specifically, states with
a higher poverty rate actually set higher income thresholds for CHIP elig-
ibility (Brown & Best, 2017). Conversely, SNAP policy reflects political and
institutional dynamics, with Republican governors presiding over signifi-
cantly more restrictive eligibility policies (Brown & Best, 2017).
In the case of TANF, shifts toward local welfare control, or devolution,
have enabled policy inequities in terms of regulations, funding, and service
delivery in areas with large populations of people of color (Soss et al., 2008).
Racist perceptions of low-income families have been consistently linked to
paternalistic and punitive TANF policy (Brown & Best, 2017; Soss et al.,
2008). Further, TANF policy choices are less likely to be affected by the ratio
of Asian and White Americans when compared to ratios of African to White
Americans (Soss et al., 2008). In Brown and Best’s (2017) analysis, political
dynamics appeared to have a minimal effect on TANF policy generosity.
Although Republican administrations tend to publicly denounce cash benefit
programs, blue states do not typically reflect a systemic generosity in elig-
ibility requirements either (Brown & Best, 2017).
However, to quantify TANF generosity, previous researchers have exam-
ined total program expenditures, the degree of local devolution, and the
income threshold for eligibility (Brown & Best, 2017; Soss et al., 2008). No
previous research has considered whether TANF asset limits are similarly
determined. In the following analysis, we seek to determine the predictive
relationships between state TANF asset limits, racial demographics, politics,
and economic conditions as each of these factors can arguably influence
welfare generosity. We also controlled for maximum monthly TANF bene-
fits, attempting to rule out the possibility that asset limits are simply a proxy
measure for other generous policies.
Methods
To determine the factors predicting state-level asset-limit determination, we
created a balanced panel for 50 states and District of Columbia over the fiscal
years 1999–2015 as no single public database contains all of the necessary
variables to properly address the research question. Previous TANF research
(Brown & Best, 2017; Soss et al., 2008) suggests that asset-limit determination
will be influenced by state economic trends, politics, and racial demo-
graphics. We therefore collected asset limits and maximum monthly TANF
benefit via the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database (2018), unemploy-
ment rates via the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018), poverty rates via the US
Census (2018a), and State House and Senate makeup via the University of
Kentucky’s Center for Poverty (2017) welfare data set. State race and income
demographics were collected via the American Community Survey (ACS)
(US Census Bureau, 2018b) for the years 2005–2015 (the ACS is only
available from 2005 on the US Census website). Data was organized by
state and year for a total of 867 state-year data points.
All independent variables (poverty rate, unemployment rate, percentage of
state upper and lower house that is Democratic, maximum TANF benefit,
median income, and state race distribution) were continuous. The dependent
variable, state asset limits for current recipients (which can sometimes differ
from those for applicants), was converted to a categorical variable to account for
states that had eliminated the limit entirely (1 = 0–999, 2 = 1,000–1999,
3 = 2000–2999, 4 = 3000–3999, 5 = 4000–4999, 6 = 5000–5999,
7 = 6000–6999, 8 = 7000–7999, 9 = 8000–8999, 10–9000–9999, 11 = 10,000+,
12 = no limit). Financial data, includingmedian income andmaximummonthly
benefit was reported in constant dollars and not adjusted for inflation. We first
explored the data via a bivariate analysis, utilizing a Pearson’s correlation. We
then completed a multiple regression with all variables. The statistical software
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 24.0 was used for all statistical
analysis.
Findings
Descriptive statistics
Several states changed or eliminated their asset test during the examination
period. Table 1 provides each state’s limits for the period 1999–2015. In some
states, there are multiple limits based upon household composition. For
simplicity, this analysis examines the lowest limit within a state.
Table 1. State Asset Limits (1999–2015)
Variable Static Limits
GA, OK, PA, RI, WA $1,000
IN $1,500
AK, AZ, DC, FL, KY, ME, MS, $2,000
NH, NJ, NY, SD, TN, UT, WV
MA, SC, WI, WY $2,500
AR, CT, MI, MT, NC $3,000
NM $3,500
NE $4,000
IA, MN, MO $5,000
OR $10,000
Variable Eliminated limits
OH No limits
VA $1,000 (99–03), No limit (04 −15)
AL, MD $2,000 (99–09), No limit (10 −15)
LA $2,000 (99–10), No limit (11–15)
IL $2,000 (99–13), No limit (14 −15)
CO $2,000 (99–06), $15,00 (07– 10), No limit (1–15)
HI $5,000 (99–12), No limit (13 −15)
Variable Increased limits
AK $1,000 (99–01), $2,000 (02– 15)
VT $1,000 (99–07), $2,000 (08– 15)
DE $1,000 (99–09), $10,000 (10– 15)
CA, KS $2,000 (99–14), $2,250 (15)
ID $2,000 (99–11), $5,000 (12– 15)
NV $2,000 (99–13), $6,000 (14– 15)
Variable Decreased limits
TX $2,000 (99–03), $1,000 (04– 15)
ND $5,000 (99–00), $3,000 (01– 15)
For all state-years (1999–2015), states experienced a mean unemployment
rate of 5.776% (SD = 2.003), a mean poverty rate of 12.684% (SD = 3.475),
and a mean median income of $51,221.955 (SD = 8848.725). State mean
TANF maximum monthly benefits for a family of three were $425.269
(SD = 161.512). Regarding state legislative makeup, states reported a mean
Democratic composition of 50.8% (SD = 16.2) in the House and 49.8%
(SD = 17.4) in the Senate. Finally, state racial makeup included a mean of
77.3% White (SD = 13.7), 11.1% Black (SD = 11.0), 1.6% American Indian or
Alaska Native (SD = 2.8), 3.7% Asian (SD = 5.5), 0.3% Native Hawaiian or
Pacific Islander (SD = 1.3), 3.2% “Some other race,” (SD = 3.1), and 2.9%
multiracial (SD = 3.1). All descriptive statistics for independent variables are
presented in Table 2.
Correlations
In our bivariate analysis, asset limits were significantly, positively associated
with state median income (r = .142, p < .01), state percentage of Asian
residents (r = .147, p < .000), state percentage of Native Hawaiian or
Pacific Islander residents (r = .150, p < .000), state percentage of residents
of two or more races (r = .150, p < .000), and negatively associated with state
percentage of American Indian or Alaska Native residents (r = −.133,
p < .01), state percentage of White residents (r = −.117, p < .01), and state
percentage of residents of some other race (r = −.131, p < .01). In our
bivariate analysis, asset limits were unrelated to the percentage of Black
residents, unemployment rate, maximum monthly benefit, the poverty rate,
or the political makeup of either houses. See Table 3 for all bivariate
relationships.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable n Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Unemployment rate 867 2.300 13.800 5.776 2.003
Poverty rate 867 4.500 25.800 12.684 3.475
State median income 561 32,938.000 75,847.000 51,221.955 8848.725
Max monthly Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families benefit
867 164.000 923.000 425.269 161.512
% Democratic State House 833 0.130 0.920 0.508 0.162
% Democratic State Senate 833 0.110 0.960 0.498 0.174
Black 561 0.003 0.568 0.111 0.110
American Indian/Alaska Nat 561 0.001 0.146 0.016 0.028
Asian 561 0.004 0.420 0.037 0.055
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 561 0.000 0.104 0.003 0.013
Some other race 561 0.002 0.173 0.032 0.031
Two or more Races 561 0.007 0.245 0.029 0.031
White 561 0.246 0.966 0.773 0.137
Multiple regression
A multiple regression was employed to explore the predictive nature of the
independent variable regressors on the dependent test variable. One standard
multiple regression was conducted to address whether poverty rate, unemploy-
ment rate, maximummonthly TANF benefit, percentage of state upper and lower
house that is Democratic, median income, or state race distribution are predictive
of TANF asset limits. The standard multiple regression for the correlates of state-
level economic, demographic, race, and TANF asset limits were statistically sig-
nificant (see Table 4). The multiple regression analysis revealed that the 12-
variable model significantly contributed to the variance of TANF asset limits, F
(12, 526) = 6.405, p < .000, and accounted for 12.8% of the variance. TANF asset
limits appear to have a different set of predictive factors in comparison to the
Table 3. Correlation: Relationship between Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Asset Limits and State-
Level Economic, Demographic, and Racial Characteristics
Variable TANF Asset Limits
Maximum TANF benefit −.012
Unemployment rate .053
State median income .142**
Poverty rate −.008
% Democratic State House .004
% Democratic State Senate .047
% Black residents .082
% White residents −.117**
% Asian residents .147***
% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander .150***
% American Indian and Alaska Native −.133**
% Two or more races .150***
% Some other race −.131**
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Table 4. Multiple Regressions: Effects of State-Level Economic, Demographic, and
Racial Predictors on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Asset Limit
TANF Asset Limitsa
Variable b SE b β
Unemployment rate .001 .069 .001
Poverty rate .034 .057 .040
State median income 8.095E-5 .000 .237**
Max monthly TANF −.002 .001 −.085
% Democratic State House −4.516 1.783 −.246
% Democratic State Senate 4.264 1.527 .256**
Black 3.798 1.849 .120*
American Indian and Alaska Native −20.034 7.291 −.186**
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander −24.922 41.824 −.109
Asian −10.512 10.161 −.195
Some other race −9.928 5.771 −.104
Two or more races 39.915 16.145 .421*
Notes. aF(12, 526) = 6.405, p < .001; Adjusted R2 = .108.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
income threshold described in previous research (Brown & Best, 2017).
Individually six of the 12 variables significantly predicted TANF asset limits.
In our regression, asset limits were significantly, positively associated with
State median income (t = 3.267, p < .01), percentage of State Senate that is
Democratic (t = 2.793, p < .01), state percentage of Black residents (t = 2.054,
p < .05), state percentage of residents of two or more races (t = 2.472,
p < .05), and significantly, negatively associated with, state percentage of
American Indian or Alaska Native residents (t = −2.748, p < .01).
Unemployment rate, poverty rate, maximum monthly TANF benefits for
family of three, percentage of State House that is Democratic, Native
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Asian, and some other race were not significantly
related to TANF asset limits, after controlling for all variables in the model.
Implications
Although limited in scope, this research makes important contributions to
the larger field of welfare politics. Although one might assume that generous
asset limits would be associated with relatively generous benefit levels, that
was not the case in the current analysis, leading us to believe that asset-limit
determination may follow separate logic than that used to determine max-
imum monthly benefits. Indeed, unlike Brown and Best (2017) analysis of
TANF income limits, TANF asset limits do appear to be influenced by state
economy (at least in terms of state median income) and the presence of
a Democratic State Senate.
Our finding that asset limits were positively associated with the percentage
of Black and multiracial residents is in contrast to previous research (Brown
& Best, 2017; Soss et al., 2008). Because so few states have eliminated or
significantly increased their limits, there appears to be differences in the
process of asset-test determination than other welfare policies. This is poten-
tially good news for advocates who seek to expand asset development oppor-
tunities to low-income families. With eight states eliminating asset tests
altogether and a further 30 excluding IDAs, there are improved opportunities
for low-income families to build assets and gain long-term financial stability.
However, IDAs may only be used for home ownership, education, and small
business development and therefore provide little cushion to families experi-
encing financial shocks such as an emergency medical bill or car repair. Only
37% of Americans report having enough cash reserves to handle a $500
financial emergency (McGrath, 2016).
As with any study, there are limitations that need to be considered. The
multivariate analysis revealed several predictive factors regarding TANF asset
limits; however, the model only explained 12.8% of the variance, which
means there is more to explore when explaining TANF asset limits. It is
possible that the process has been idiosyncratic and would greatly benefit
from further research. We suspect that the influence of advocacy organiza-
tions (Prosperity Now, 2018) that have been quietly working to remove
barriers to asset accumulation among the poor have influenced this policy
variance.
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